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—  Sympos ium — 
Whren at Twenty:  
Systemic Racial Bias and the 
Criminal Justice System 
Introduction 
Lewis R. Katz† 
Street relations between the police and African-American commun-
ities have seemingly reached new levels of conflict, or else body cams 
and cell phones are finally disclosing the extent and truth about such 
interactions. The Cleveland officers who shot and killed Tamir Rice 
claimed that they had ordered him three times to drop the realistic toy 
gun he was playing with. The existence of the tape totally discredits 
their claim. Without the video, the media and White America would 
have summarily accepted the Cleveland officers’ account. Similarly, the 
University of Cincinnati police officer who is charged with the murder 
of Samuel DuBose originally claimed that he was being dragged by 
DuBose’s car and had to shoot to save his life. The officer’s false claim 
was corroborated by two other officers on the same force. Scarily, 
jurors—or one juror, for that is all it takes—might choose to disbelieve 
what they see and vote to acquit the University of Cincinnati police 
officer. 
These videos tragically corroborate Ta-Nehisi Coates’s claim that 
America (and so-called “white bodies”) always has and continues to 
enslave, segregate, imprison, break, and kill black bodies.1 
 
†  John C. Hutchens Professor of Law and Director, Foreign Graduate Legal 
Studies at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I have taught 
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure here for fifty years. I want to thank 
Kevin Gross and Seth Osnowitz for their assistance in researching this subject. 
1. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between The World And Me 103–05 (2015). 
Here is what I would like for you to know: In America, it is traditional 
to destroy the black body—it is heritage. 
Enslavement was not merely the antiseptic borrowing of Labor—it is 
not so easy to get a human being to commit their body against its own 
elemental interest. And so enslavement must be casual wrath and 
random manglings, the gashing of heads and brains blown out over 
the river as the body seeks to escape. It must be rape so regular as to 
be industrial. There is no uplifting way to say this . . . . It could only 
be the employment of carriage whips, tongs, iron pokers, handsaws, 
stones, paperweights, or whatever might be handy to break the black 
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At the same time, every day spokesmen for the law enforcement 
industry appear on cable television and attribute the rise of murders in 
cities like Baltimore and Chicago and, sadly, Cleveland to the abandon-
ment of the so-called “broken windows” policy. The broken windows 
policy they want reinstated is law enforcement without the Fourth 
Amendment; it is law enforcement based upon racial profiling; it is law 
enforcement that gives the police license to violate the law. Some of 
those same self-proclaimed spokespersons are blaming recent police kill-
ings on the “Black Lives Matter” movement. Their outrage with Black 
Lives Matter, and its putative substitute, All Lives Matter, operates 
from a false premise. Implicit in Black Lives Matter is Too. Unlike the 
Black Lives Matter movement which followed on police killings in Miss-
ouri, New York, South Carolina, and here in Cleveland, none of the 
police apologists were arguing that All Lives Matter, meaning all lives, 
including African-American young men. Instead, police union repre-
sentatives appear on television immediately following police shootings 
to claim that the killings of young black men are justified. Those claims 
often are made so quickly that they are uttered before the facts are 
known. Let’s face it, there will be no change in America until we really 
mean that ALL LIVES MATTER. 
It is appropriate that this symposium acknowledges that the Sup-
reme Court Term that began earlier this month marks the twentieth 
anniversary of the Court’s decision in Whren v. United States.2 My 
choice of the word “acknowledge” is a neutral term. It is not intended 
to signify concurrence or celebration. Whren puts the Supreme Court 
squarely in the middle of the ongoing conflict: Whren fostered the con-
dition that resulted in the current conflicts: racial policing. Nor has it 
been unusual in our history for the Supreme Court to stand at the 
forefront of racial injustice. In fact, except for a short period in our 
nation’s history, 1954 to 1965, from Brown v. Board of Education3 to 
Mapp v. Ohio4 to Gideon v. Wainwright5 to Baker v. Carr,6 the United 
 
body, the black family, the black community, the black nation . . . .  
That was true in 1776. It is true today. 
Id.  
2. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating laws mandating separate schools for black 
and white children). 
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule 
applies to the states, meaning state courts must suppress evidence gathered 
when police violate the Fourth Amendment to obtain the evidence). 
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts 
to appoint attorneys for defendants who cannot afford counsel). 
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that districts for the election of members of 
state legislatures and Congress are required to be reasonably equal in size as 
to population, which had the effect of increasing the political power of urban 
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States Supreme Court has promoted or facilitated injustice against 
African Americans. 
We don’t have to go back to the Dred Scott case in 1857, almost 
universally thought to be the worst case in the Court’s history, to find 
the Supreme Court on the side of injustice against blacks.7 During Re-
construction the Supreme Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state action.8 The Court helped President Rutherford 
B. Hayes strike the blow that ended Reconstruction. In United States 
v. Harris,9 the Supreme Court invalidated the Ku Klux Klan act,10 Con-
gress’s attempt to fight white terrorism rampant then in the former 
confederate states. Despite the conspiratorial links between those terr-
orists to southern law enforcement and elected officials to discourage 
blacks in the south from participating in public life by voting and runn-
ing for public office, the Court held that “[i]t was never supposed that 
the section under consideration conferred on Congress the power to 
enact a law which would punish a private citizen for an invasion of the 
rights of his fellow citizen.”11 Thus ended Reconstruction and America’s 
commitment to black equality until 1964 and 1965, and the adoption 
of the Public Accommodation Act12 and Voting Rights Act.13 The recent 
Supreme Court decision watering down the Voting Rights Act fits into 
this common pattern, though, and abets states that, under the false 
 
areas with greater population and reducing the influence of less populated 
rural areas). 
7. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that African Americans, 
whether enslaved or free, could not be American citizens and therefore had 
no standing to sue in federal court and that the federal government had no 
power to regulate slavery in the federal territories acquired after the 
creation of the United States). 
8. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542–43 (1875) (holding that 
states have the duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect “all its 
citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights” and that “[t]he only oblig-
ation resting upon the [federal government] is to see that the States do not 
deny the right[s]”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that 
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only safe-
guards the rights of citizens of the United States against the actions of states). 
9. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
10. Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3) (2011)) (“If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire 
or go in disguise upon the highway or on the premises of another for the 
purpose of depriving either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons 
of the equal protection of the law . . . .”). 
11. Harris, 106 U.S. at 644. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012); see Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
(invalidating § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, thereby no longer requiring 
jurisdictions with histories of discrimination to demonstrate that any proposed 
voting change is not discriminatory before that change can be implemented). 
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claim of preventing voting fraud, are attempting to make it more diffi-
cult for African Americans to vote. 
Whren v. United States14 belongs in this same column. In the name 
of racial neutrality, the unanimous Court15 sweepingly interprets the 
Fourth Amendment to allow blatant, and, at times, admitted, racial 
profiling when stopping automobiles. 
Whren occurred when District of Columbia vice-squad police off-
icers were patrolling for drug activity in a high drug area on the night 
of June 10, 1993.16 Officers Efrain Soto, Jr. and Homer Littlejohn were 
among the plainclothes officers searching for drug activity that night, 
and they were passengers in an unmarked police cruiser that was being 
driven by Investigator Tony Howard.17 As Investigator Howard drove 
past an SUV that was stopped at a stop sign, Officer Soto observed the 
youthful driver of the SUV looking into the lap of his front seat passen-
ger.18 Officer Soto kept his eyes on the SUV as Investigator Howard 
continued driving away from it; Soto testified that the SUV remained 
at the stop sign for “more than twenty seconds” with “at least one car” 
stopped behind it.19 Although the District of Columbia police regula-
tions permitted plainclothes officers in unmarked police cruisers to en-
force traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to 
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others[,]”20 Investigator How-
ard decided to pursue the SUV.21 
As Investigator Howard maneuvered the U-turn, the SUV “turned 
suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an ‘unreason-
able’ speed.’”22 Thereafter, Investigator Howard tailed the SUV until 
catching up and pulling alongside it at a red light.23 Then, Officer Soto 
immediately exited the unmarked police cruiser and identified himself 
as a police officer as he approached the driver’s door of the SUV.24 After 
demanding that the driver of the SUV, James Lester Brown, put the 
vehicle in park, Officer Soto noticed that the passenger, Michael Whren, 
was holding a large clear plastic bag in each of his hands. Suspecting 
 
14. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
15. If I had the chance to ask Justice Ginsburg one question, it would be how 
she let this one slip by her. 
16. Whren, 517 U.S. at 807–08. 
17. U.S. v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Whren, 517 U.S at 815 (citation omitted). 
21. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372. 
22. Whren, 517 U.S at 808. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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that the plastic bags contained cocaine, Officer Soto yelled “C.S.A.” to 
notify the other officers that he observed a Controlled Substance Act 
violation.25 Then, Officer Soto heard Whren yell “pull off, pull off,” and 
observed Whren pull the cover off of a power window control panel on 
the passenger door and put one of the plastic bags into the hidden 
compartment.26 As a result, Officer Soto opened the driver’s door of the 
SUV, dove across Brown and grabbed the other plastic bag from 
Whren’s hand.27 Soon thereafter, Brown and Whren were arrested and 
the officers subsequently searched the SUV, recovering “two tinfoils 
containing marijuana laced with PCP, a bag of chunky white rocks and 
a large white rock of crack cocaine from the hidden compartment on 
the passenger side door, numerous unused ziplock bags, a portable pho-
ne and personal papers.”28 The defendants were convicted of four federal 
narcotics offenses.29 Prior to trial, the defendants challenged the stop, 
claiming that the stop to issue a warning to the driver was pretextual.30 
Justice Scalia claimed to agree with the defendants’ claim “that the 
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on consid-
erations such as race.”31 Cynically, however, he refers the defendants to 
the Equal Protection Clause to object to intentional discriminatory 
application of the law, rather than the Fourth Amendment.32 However, 
there is no remedy in a criminal case except in New Jersey for a police 
stop or arrest based on race under the Equal Protection Clause.33 The 
only real remedy for a pretextual stop or arrest would be under the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. However, Whren tells us that 
 




29. The four offenses included:  
(1) possession with intent to distribute [fifty] grams or more of cocaine 
base or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1) 
(A)(iii) (Count One); (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
base within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) 
(Count Two); (3) possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Count Three); and (4) possession of 
a controlled substance (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 
(Count Four).  
Whren, F.3d at 372. 
30. Whren, 517 U.S. at 806. 
31. Id. at 813. 
32. Id. 
33. State v. Segars, 172 N.J. 481 (2002); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
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remedy is not available if there is an “objective” basis—reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause—for the stop or arrest. The Court stresses that 
an “officer’s motive” for the stop or arrest, even when based upon race, 
does not “invalidate[ ] objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment.”34 The Court tells us it is so, not why it is so, so we can 
assume that it is so because of the Court’s hostility to the exclusionary 
rule. Further the Court rejects the alternative test that would invalid-
ate a stop if a reasonable police officer would not have made the stop 
under the circumstances, even though that substitute variation to 
determine pretext had worked somewhat well.35 Scalia rejects the “rea-
sonable officer” test: “Why one would frame a test designed to combat 
pretext in such fashion that the court cannot take into account actual 
and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained by the 
fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option.”36 That’s 
an obvious reason to advance the alternative theory. It is actually deb-
atable which was the more sensible option: the subjective test, which 
depended upon a police officer truthfully admitting on the witness stand 
that he stopped a particular car because of the race of the occupants 
(there are a few rare instances of such admissions)37 or the reasonable 
officer test which measures a stop by whether reasonable officers in the 
jurisdiction would have made the stop (such as the officers in Whren 
who ignored departmental regulations by engaging in traffic enforce-
ment in the absence of an immediate threat of safety to others). The 
Scalia opinion in Whren foreclosed federal and state courts from engag-
ing in that debate under the Fourth Amendment. 
Let’s face it, Whren legalizes any stop where there is reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred 
or is occurring no matter how blatant the pretextual nature of that 
stop. Make no mistake, Whren helped pave the way for traffic stops 
resulting in the death of black drivers that are causing conflict in our 
society today. I believe that we will continue to face this problem until 
at least Whren is reversed. Cases like Whren are not race neutral. They 
sanction and encourage race-based policing, which is the ultimate Scalia 
legacy. Whren is squarely in the tradition of those judges who enforced 
the Fugitive Slave Act, which paved the way for the Civil War.38 How-
ever, the reversal of Whren is of now just a fantasy of mine because it 
 
34. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812. 
35. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815; Lewis R. Katz, ‘‘Lonesome Road”: Driving Without 
the Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1419 (2013). 
36. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814. 
37. Katz, supra note 35, at 1421 (citing United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 
113 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
38. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered, 29 Law & 
Hist. Rev. 797 (2011) (challenging the conventional belief that “neutral legal 
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depends upon the election of a president committed to appointing jud-
ges who will enforce the Fourth Amendment and enough (60) votes in 
the Senate to confirm those judges. 
We have distinguished panelists here today who will address these 
issues: distinguished scholars, such as the pioneer Professor David 
Harris, on race-based policing and race in America, and outstanding 
practitioners who face the ramification of Whren every day in court. 




principles required antislavery judges to uphold proslavery legislation in spite 
of their moral convictions against slavery”). 
